The Fall of Omar al Bashir

 Olivia Mattsson Clarke

This is the second article in the series about Sudan; if you have not read the previous one, titled The Brutal Reign of Omar el Bashir, I would suggest you do so before reading this one. It highlights the violence and persecution that took place during the years before the fall of Omar el Bashir which is what will be discussed in this article.

Throughout history, autocratic leaders have been subject to civilian protests, sometimes forcing them to step down from their reign. This can be seen for example when King Louis was beheaded as a result of the French Revolution, or when the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych was impeached following the Euromaidan protests in 2014.

The ousting of Omar el Bashir in 2019 provides yet another example of this. A terrible economic situation as a result of losing oil rigs to the independence of South Sudan, as well as US sanctions sparked protests across the country. This culminated in a sit-in outside the Sudanese Armed Forces’ General Command in the capital which resulted in a military coup overthrowing the dictator.

The story of Bahsir’s ousting starts on 19 December 2018 in Atbara in the north of the country. Residents burned the headquarters of Bashir’s party, the National Congress Party, in response to rising prices and the end to subsidies on basic goods. Previously, Bashir had managed to maintain support from Sudan’s powerbrokers, especially within the security apparatus, hence ensuring loyalty towards himself. This technique protected him from a wave of democratization in the early 1990s, as well as the Arab Spring beginning in 2010. This time however, protests spread, demanding an end to the military-backed presidency and transition to civilian rule. 

About 4 months after the start of the protests, hundreds of thousands of people were demonstrating in the country’s capital Khartoum. In the demonstrations, the people used a chant from the Arab Spring: “The people want the fall of the regime”, alongside coming up with their own slogans. But how did Sudan end up there, from the protests in Atbara?

There had been sporadic protests in December due to the country finding itself in deep economic crisis, but the Atbara mobilisation was seen as a shift from the demonstrations not being purely economic to also being political. The protests spread to Damazin, where young girls went into a market singing anti-austerity slogans after the price of bread had increased threefold and the price of their school meals had doubled. Others joined, blaming the crisis on economic policies and corruption, and demanded an end to the reign of Bashir’s party. Images were shared on Social Media which inspired further engagement. 

On the 25 of December, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), consisting of doctors, healthcare workers and lawyers, had planned to protest about the economic situation of the country. However, opposition parties to Omar el Bashir convinced the Association to host a more political demonstration, linking the economic crisis of Sudan to the corruption of the government, and calling for the end of Bashir’s reign. Community leaders state that this was a turning point: 5-10 thousand people attended, making it among the biggest protests in downtown Khartoum since Bashir came to power. This highlights how community leaders and opposition parties made use of civil discontent in a way that had not been done before. 

In January 2019, the different arms of opposition against the regime formed the group Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). However, the SPA remained the face outwards of the protests since the FFC consisted of individual opposition that were unpopular. At this point, schedules for organised resistance were posted on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter as well as printed on traditional flyers. Sometimes the SPA called for people to attend demonstrations or protests, whereas other times there was room for individual initiatives such as spray-painting graffiti or changing one’s profile picture on social media to show discontent with the regime. 

The FFC requested that people organise neighbourhood popular committees who would coordinate demonstrations on a local level nationwide. These committees were important when it came to organising guerilla-like protests on an urban level. When there were small protests in multiple neighbourhoods every day, the security forces struggled to keep up in Khartoum and other large cities.

Women were an important part of the uprising, some of the highest estimates indicate that they made up 70% of the protesters – statements made by activists and images shared from the protests support this. The Journal of Democracy indicates this may be due to Bahsir’s strict Islamization policies. There were rules and regulations about women’s employment, social lives and dress. For example, they could not wear trousers and had to cover their hair in public. 

Despite that the FFC included armed rebel groups, they and the SPA insisted that no violent tactics should be used. However, between December 2018 and early April 2019, more than 100 protesters were killed by security organs. As is seen often in the cycle of protests in a country, the funerals of the people killed often sparked new spontaneous protests.  

In April, the SPA picked up the pace of protest by calling for a March of Millions. The event took place on the 6 of April, which is the anniversary of the 1985 uprising of civilians that overthrew Jafaar Mohamed Nimeiri, and it is estimated to have attracted hundreds of thousands of protesters. The March of Millions led to a demonstration outside the Sudanese Armed Forces’ General Command. Towards the end of the day, the FFC appealed to protestors to stay and partake in a permanent sit-in until the regime of Omar el Bashir fell. 

During the following 5 days the amount of protestors increased, and it became apparent that Bashir had become a danger to the financial interests and the public image of the security apparatus. He had attempted to solve the economic crisis by implementing austerity measures, subsidies and appointing  knowledgeable advisors within the area. Further he tried to quell the demonstrations of his people, through for example restricting their access to social media or authorising violence. It was evident that there was no political solution possible where he would remain in government and the protestors would be satisfied. On the 11 April, General Awad Ibn Auf, who was Bashir’s Vice President and Defence Minister, made an announcement suggesting the protestors had partially achieved their goal. The Sudanese Armed Forces, the National Intelligence as well as the  Security Service and the paramilitary group the Rapid Support Forces together with several police forces had removed Bashir from office. 

The leaders of the coup announced that there would be a two year transition to civilian rule, which the security apparatus would supervise. Over a million people celebrated the fall of Bashir, while simultaneously calling for the ousting of General Auf as well; he was seen as being too closely connected to Bahsir’s rule to be considered a true change of regime. Within the space of mere 3 hours, Auf had stepped down and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had taken his place. Burhan became head of the Transitional Military Council, with a man known as Hemedti by his side. This sets the scene for what is to become the current crisis in Sudan. The people wanted a transition to a civilian government, but they got a Transitional Military Council that would sit for two years. Still, Bashir had been ousted, so there was room for elation in the country. In the next article, we will explore how the Transitional Military Council in fact did not lead to a civilian rule, but instead led to a dangerous power struggle which is stirring up old wounds in Darfur.